1st UConn History of Analytic Philosophy Conference

Frege

University of Connecticut · Storrs, CT · Babbidge Library, 4th floor, Heritage Room
November 10–11, 2018

Saturday, November 10

11:00 – 12:15 Kai Wehmeier (UC Irvine): “Fregean predicate logic, deixis, and anaphora”
12:15 – 1:30 Lunch break
1:30 – 2:45 Roy T. Cook (Minnesota): “Grundgesetze §10”
3:00 – 4:15 Sanford Shieh (Wesleyan): “On Taking the Step to a Truth-Value”
4:15 – 4:45 Coffee break
4:45 – 6:00 Junyeol Kim (UConn): “The Horizontal in Begriffsschrift”
8:00 Conference dinner

Sunday, November 11

11:45 – 1:00 Patricia Blanchette (Notre Dame): “Caesar and Objects Again”

Invited discussants and commentators include:
Philip A. Ebert (Stirling)  Michael Hallett (McGill)
Richard Kimberly Heck (Brown)  Robert May (UC Davis)

Organizers:
Junyeol Kim & Marcus Rossberg, for the UConn Philosophy Department
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We would like to thank the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute and the UConn Logic Group for their generous support.
Patricia Blanchette (Notre Dame)
*Caesar and Objects Again*

I think there are some problems with the idea that the ‘Caesar passages’ in *Grundlagen* show Frege expressing the view that successful introduction of a singular term requires the determination of truth-conditions for every identity-sentence involving that term. In this very preliminary discussion, I would like to lay out what I take to be problematic about that view, and work toward an alternative understanding of those passages and of Frege’s view of mathematical objects more generally.

Roy T. Cook (Minnesota)
*Grundgesetze §10*

In this talk I will present a careful, correct reconstruction of the so-called permutation argument given by Frege in Section 10 of *Grundgesetze*. I will then explore a number of issues connected to this proof, including examining: (1) the role that this proof (and the subsequent identification of truth values with value-ranges) has for our understanding of Basic Law V; (2) the connection between this proof and the attempted soundness proof found later in *Grundgesetze*; and (3) how we should understand this proof in light of Frege’s well-known hostility to independence proofs as evidenced in his correspondence with Hilbert.

Sanford Shieh (Wesleyan)
*On Taking the Step to a Truth-Value*

In “On Sense and Reference,” Frege suggests that in every judgment a step (Schritt) is taken from a thought to a truth-value. This is one of a number of obscure or controversial claims Frege makes about truth in his post-sense/reference writings. As is well-known, some of the others are: (1) that truth is not definable, (2) that ascriptions of truth to thoughts or statements are in some way redundant, (3) that the truth-values are objects to which some but not all thoughts refer, and, (4) that truth is absolute in the sense that no thought is true relative to time, place, or circumstance, as opposed to true, simpliciter. It not clear what these positions mean, nor whether they are mutually consistent. In this talk I hope to tie them together into a coherent package, based on a reading of what taking a step to a truth-value consists in. I will make a case that what is fundamental for Frege is judgment as recognition of what is the case, and that this fundamental conception underlies his pronouncements on truth.

Junyeol Kim (UConn)
*The Horizontal in Begriffsschrift*

The well-formed sentence of Frege’s logic, Begriffsschrift, starts with the sign ‘—’, which can be taken as a performative for making an assertion. This performative is compositional in that it consists of two different signs: the judgment stroke and the horizontal. It has not been satisfactorily answered why this performative for asserting must be compositional. In this paper, I suggest a new answer to this question by taking Frege’s mature conception of judgment/assertion into account. I argue that, for Frege, to judge/assert that p is to identify the truth-value, the True, with the reference of ‘p’ without judging/asserting that the reference of ‘p’ is the True. I show that this interpretation of Frege’s mature conception of judgment/assertion leads to a new way of explaining why the judgment stroke must be followed by the horizontal.

Jamie Tappenden (University of Michigan)
*Frege, Carl Snell and Romanticism; Fruitful Concepts and the ‘Organic/Mechanical’ Distinction*

A surprisingly neglected figure in Frege scholarship is the man Frege describes (with praise that is very rare for Frege) as his “revered teacher”, the Jena physics and mathematics professor Carl Snell. It turns out that there is more of interest to say about Snell than can fit into one talk, so I’ll restrict attention here to just this aspect of his thought: the role of the concept of “organic”, and a contrast with “mechanical”. Snell turns out to have been a philosophical Romantic, influenced by Schelling and Goethe, and Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*. In Frege’s environment, the “organic/mechanical” contrast, understood in a distinctively Romantic fashion, had reached the status of “accepted, recognized cliché”. More generally, Frege’s environment was more saturated with what we now call “Continental philosophy” than we might expect.

Kai Wehmeier (UC Irvine)
*Fregean predicate logic, deixis, and anaphora*

I will address some issues that arise for the system of Fregean predicate logic I developed in “The proper treatment of variables in predicate logic” (*Linguistics & Philosophy* 2018) in connection with deictic utterances and cross-sentential anaphora.